Degraded System Detection Requirements for Structural Monitoring Systems





20 April 2004 HUMS Technical Interchange Meeting


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OBJECTIVE

- Provide assessment of Q/A (quality assurance) issues for various types of monitoring systems
 - Assess ease of detecting various levels of degraded system operation
 - Evaluate impact of system degradation on fatigue damage assessment
- Provide FAA with key information necessary to:
 - Define minimum acceptable system capabilities
 - Evaluate vendor proposed systems



DATA Q/A ASSESSMENT POINTS

Parameter
Data
Output

Regime Output

Lo		R	
1.0	0	0	
1.1 0	10	0	
1.15	20	0	
1.18	25	100	
1.18	30	200	
2.00	60	400	

60

600

2.00

Level flight

Climb

Turn 30 AOB

Level flight

Dive

Level flight

approach

hover

Component Damage Output

Component	Damage
Pitch Link	.00001
Rotor Hub	.00002
Swashplate	.00025
M.R. Blade	.00001

Q/A Assessment Approach

Can the degradation be identified at points of assessment?

Point of Detection

Means of Detection

- 1. Parameter data output
- Scan for missing parameter values
- Check parameter magnitude drift against fleet wide bounds

2. Regime output

- Evaluate for deviation in usage pattern for individual aircraft and fleet norm
- Evaluate occurrences/ % time for increase or decrease against individual aircraft history and fleet norm
- Screen individual maneuver durations for significant deviation
- 3. Damage rate output
- Evaluate variance in individual component and fleet wide damage rates

BASIC MONITORING PARAMETERS

PARAMETER			
Airspeed			
Pitch Attitude			
Roll Attitude			
Pitch Rate			
Roll Rate			
Yaw Rate			
Vertical Acceleration			
Vertical Velocity			
Engine Torque			
Weight on Wheels			
Rotor Speed			
Fuel Quantity			
Pilot Stick Positions			
Altitude			
Outside Air Temperature			
Gross Weight			
Rotor Brake			

	V-22	H-53	H-60	AH-1Z	UH-1Y
Blade Fold	X	X	X	X	X
Sling Load	X	X			
Aerial Refuel	X				
Wing Stow	X				
Landing Gear Position	X				
Nacelle Angle	X				
Pylon Fold		X			
RAST			X		
Weapons Configuration				X	

TYPES OF PARAMETER DEGRADATION TO BE CONSIDERED


Parameter signal discrepancies

- Loss of Signal
- Random Loss of signal
- Bias signal --- high / low
 - Various magnitudes of degradation 10%, 20%, etc.
- Drifting signal over time
- Band edge output

Data input discrepancies

- Erroneous estimates high / low
- no data entered / submitted

Detection Methods for Degraded Component Damage Rate Calculations




Accumulated flight hours


Evaluate component damage rate against:

- Previous individual aircraft component damage rate
- Fleet maximum and minimum damage rates for the component

Detection Methods For Degraded Regime Output



Operating Regime



Operating Regime

Baseline Usage Database Development

- Construct the "fleet baseline usage" data file
 - Use applicable flight test data from HUMS verification flights or original aircraft structural qualification flights
 - Use combinations of this data to construct a usage file that represents approx 3000 hours of fleet usage
- Use "fleet baseline usage" file to generate baseline statistics
 - Typical individual maneuver durations
 - Occurrence rate for certain maneuvers (turns, pullups, etc)
 - % Spectrum time for each applicable maneuver/regime

Degraded Condition Database Development

- Degraded flight data runs
 - Simulate various degraded data conditions
 - Many separate runs to evaluate the effect of various types of degradation
 - Degraded output will be compared to the baseline file
 - o regime sequence
 - o maneuver duration
 - o # of occurrences of each regime
 - o damage rates for select components
- Assess level of detect ability for each degradation type

Q/A Study Anticipated Results

- 1. Determine the feasibility of detecting various types of HUMS system degradation at the three possible data assessment points.
- 2. Identify the most effective method to use in detecting various types of system degradation.
- 3. Determine the limits of degradation detection possible for various types of HUMS systems
- 4. Provide some initial guidelines for Q/A criteria to detect system degradation

Q/A Study Sample Results

- SH-60B 1553 Databus Parameter Availability
 - 1553 is not mission essential
 - If a crewman rides in the back, the bus is powered up but crewman is not required to ride in the back
 - Result 1553 databus signals not recorded for many flights
 - Airspeed is one of the parameters on this bus

Q/A Study Sample Results Loss of Airspeed Measurement

- Degraded system data file was created to simulate loss of airspeed measurement, value set to zero
- Degraded system data results
 - High speed transient maneuvers no longer recognized
 - Level flight time above 50 knots changes dramatically
 - Low speed level flight time increases dramatically

- Loss of airspeed can be detected as a significant change in typical time spent in level flight
- Loss of airspeed measurement can also be detected by inspection of regime input parameter data

Q/A Study Sample Results Gain or Sensor Bias Problems

- A degraded system file was created where airspeed was increased by 10%
- Degraded system data results
 - No significant change in maneuvers recognized but a shift toward higher airspeeds occurs
 - Level flight, turns and pullups each have the same total time but higher percentage at high speed.

- This type of problem will be difficult to detect as a regime recognition anomoly
- However, shift toward higher airspeeds will affect damage accumulation rate. Need to assess how much bias error will result in detectable anomolies.

Q/A Study Sample Results Gain or Sensor Bias Problems

- A degraded system file was created where Nz was increased by 10%
- Degraded system data results
 - No significant change in maneuvers recognized but turns and pullups showed shift toward higher g-levels
 - Turns and pullups each have the same total time but higher percentage at high g-levels.

- This type of problem will be difficult to detect as a regime recognition anomoly
- However, shift toward higher g-levels will affect damage accumulation rate. Need to assess how much bias error will result in detectable anomolies.

Q/A Study Sample Results System Installation Errors

- Installation errors can lead to faulty signal measurements
 - Wires crossed on Nz for CH-53 initial prototype installation
- Prototype installation data review
 - Recorded data and regimes recognized compared to pilot card flight test maneuver descriptions
 - Example 1, Pilot card reports Symmetric Pullup flown
 - Recorded data: Nz dropped below one
 - Regime recognized: Pushover
 - Example 2, Pilot card reports Pushover flown
 - Recorded data: Nz goes above 1.0
 - Regime recognized: Pullup
 - Following identification of problem, reversed wire corrected

Q/A Study Sample Results System Installation Errors

- A degraded system file was created simulating Nz having crossed wires
- Degraded system data results
 - More time spent in pushovers and less time spent in pullups
 - However, total time in pullups and pushovers is typically small

- Without a scripted pilot record of intentionally flown pullups and pushovers, this anomoly will be difficult to detect through a change in regime usage
- Review of raw data would readily reveal this problem though
 - During turning flight, roll attitude will increase; as roll attitude increases, vertical acceleration will increase above 1g
 - A decrease in Nz below 1g during steady turning flight is an indication of a crossed Nz wire.

Summary and Planned Work

- Several data system anomolies have been investigated including a loss of parameter signal, sensor bias or gain errors, and a crossed wire signal.
- Preliminary results have shown that data integrity checks need to be in place at various levels in the structural monitoring process including:
 - Raw parameters
 - Regimes/usage spectrum recognized
 - Damage accumulation rate
- More rigorous and complete analysis is needed to provide detailed data integrity checks for each type of anomaly for each parameter of interest
- Parts tracking system data flow issues need to be investigated